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COMMENT
CHAPTER X TRUSTEE ADOPTION OF EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS: THE BANKRUPTCY ACT SPEAKS
THROUGH ITS SILENCE
Under the present federal bankruptcy statute, a company whose
indebtedness has placed it in financial difficulty can elect to avoid
straight bankruptcy, and consequent corporate dismemberment, by
attempting a reorganization. Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act' pro-
vides judicial machinery for the reorganization of the large, publicly
held corporation with a complex debt structure. -
A chapter X proceeding can be initiated voluntarily, or by the
corporation's creditors,3 by filing a petition in district court stating
that the corporation is insolvent or unable to pay its debts as they
mature.4 Upon court approval of the petition, the district judge must
appoint a trustee if liabilities exceed $250,000, while such appointment
is discretionary if liabilities are less than that sum." The trustee
appointed must be "disinterested";' he is to have no financial con-
nection with, or interest in, the debtor corporation. He is usually
experienced in the debtor's field of business. The trustee's order of
appointment vests him with title to the debtor's property 7 and gives
him authority to perform administrative and management functions,
152 Stat. 883 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964).
2Chapter XI, 52 Stat 905 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§701-799 (1964),
also covers corporations, but is intended primarily to provide a simple method for the
composition or extension of unsecured indebtedness by an individual or by a small cor-
poration with few shareholders. A chapter XI arrangement is always voluntary. For
a good discussion of the differences between these two chapters as applied to a re-
organization which fell somewhere between the two, see Grayson-Robinson Stores,
Inc. v. SEC, 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963), and authorities cited id. at 948 n.10.
3 Bankruptcy Act § 126, 52 Stat. 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1964). Three
or more creditors with aggregate claims of $5,000 or more are required.
4 Bankruptcy Act § 130, 52 Stat 886 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 530 (1964).
5 Bankruptcy Act § 156, 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1964).6 Ibid. For the act's definition of who is not disinterested, see § 158, 52 Stat. 888
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1964).
7 Bankruptcy Act § 186, 52 Stat. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 586 (1964). A debtor
in possession has the same title under § 188, 52 Stat. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 588
(1964).
8 Bankruptcy Act § 189, 52 Stat. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 589 (1964). One com-
mentator remarks:
Broadly speaking, the purpose of this order is to permit a trustee to
operate the business of the debtor in substantially the manner in which it had
been operated by the debtor itself without constant resort to the court . . .
for instructions on relatively unimportant points. The trustee will, however,
if well advised, request instructions [from the judge under whose authority
the proceedings are held] from time to time where any fundamental change
of business or financial policy is involved.
Israels, Some Problems of Policy and Procedure in the Conduct of Reorganization
Proceedings, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 63, 72 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
Almost as a corollary, the trustee is held to a high degree of responsibility: he
must exercise the care and control that a man of ordinary prudence would exercise
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The order of appointment can be quite detailed in its instructions to
the trustee, but its general thrust will be to empower the trustee to
operate the business profitably, without prejudicing any creditor or
shareholder rights.
In order to enable the debtor to get back on its feet, the re-
organization court's approval of the petition acts as a stay of any
proceedings to enforce any lien or claims against the debtor's prop-
erty.9 Given this breathing space, the trustee examines the debtor
corporation."0 If he determines that a successful reorganization can
be achieved," he begins to streamline the debtor's business. The court
is specifically empowered by the act to discard unprofitable executory
contracts and leases of real property. Section 116(1) provides:
Upon the approval of a petition, the judge may . . . (1) per-
mit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor,
except contracts in the public authority, upon notice to the
parties to such contracts and to such other parties in
interest as the judge may designate.'
This section requires the trustee to petition the judge before any
contract or lease may be rejected, 3 thereby protecting the in-
over his own property. E.g., I. re Schott Brewing Co., 40 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. Ill.
1941). And consider the following:
The controlling fact . . . is that a reorganization trustee operates the
properties for the benefit of the private parties concerned with a view of
making the maximum profit from them. He stands in the position of the
employer ....
FINLETTER, BANKRUPTcY REORGANIZATION 205 (1939).
9 Bankruptcy Act § 148, 52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1964).
10 An investigation of the debtor's past management and general financial con-
dition may proceed under § 167 of the Bankruptcy Act. 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11
U.S.C. §567 (1964).
11 Bankruptcy Act § 167(5), 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567(5) (1964)
The trustee upon his appointment and qualification . . . (5) shall, at the
earliest date practicable, prepare and submit a brief statement of his investiga-
tion of the property, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the
operation of its business and the desirability of the continuance thereof, in
such form and manner as the judge may direct ....
Unlike chapter XI, chapter X has no requirement that the debtor's initial petition
be accompanied by a statement of its executory contracts. See § 324, 52 Stat. 907
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 724 (1964). Compare note 69 infra.
12 52 Stat. 885 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1964). An unexpired
lease of real property is an executory contract. Section 106(7), 52 Stat. 883 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §506(7) (1964). This study will not consider whether the contract in
question is an executory contract within the meaning of § 116(1) or § 216(4), see
text accompanying note 22 infra, but will assume the contract's executory nature in
every case. Compare Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy
and Reorganization, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 467, 474-83 (1964). And insofar as this
study is limited to a study of adoption procedure, no distinction has been drawn
between debtor as lessor or as lessee. Compare id. at 484.
13 Both In re Childs Co., 64 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 146 F.2d 592 (2d
Cir. 1944), and the history of this section as elucidated herein should make it clear
that § 116(1) is at the very least to be interpreted in the same way as was § 77B (c) (5),
requiring court approval for rejection. See note 37 infra.
The requirements of the comparable straight bankruptcy procedure under § 70(b)
are inapplicable to a chapter X proceeding. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
[Vo1.115:937
BANKRUPTCY AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
terests of the other party to the contract by requiring judicial
consideration.' 4
Any party whose contract with the debtor has been rejected pur-
suant to section 116(1) is deemed a general creditor under the
provisions of section 202,"5 and is allowed to file a claim for damages
which is to be paid pro rata from the assets available to unsecured
creditors under the reorganization plan.
The maintenance of the debtor's business operations will, of
course, require the trustee to continue many contractual obligations;
yet chapter X fails to set out any required statutory procedure for
trustee adoption or affirmance of the debtor's executory contracts.
During the time the tfustee is streamlining the debtor's business,
he is drafting a "reorganization plan." 1" This plan is a legal document
rearranging creditors' and shareholders' rights in order both to make
the business capable of showing a profit, and to gain the new capital
needed to make the business self-sufficient. The plan is submitted to
the court within the judicially established time limit, 1 which can be,
and often is, extended upon petition by the trustee.' The time re-
quired to draw up a feasible plan varies from case to case-several
months,' 9 two years,2" even twenty-nine years in one instance.2' Com-
plexity of the corporation's capital structure and its financial arrange-
ments obviously affect the length of time needed.
14 Court approval of the rejection of executory contracts necessarily results in
an increase in the time and consequent expense of administration, in part through
the expense of the hearings themselves, which are charged to the estate as an expense
of administration under § 64(a) (1). 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 104(a) (1) (1964). Justification for this result is suggested in note 56 infra.
15 52 Stat. 893 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1964), constrited in 120 Wall Associates
v. Schilling, 266 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1959); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433 (1937) (interpreting § 77B (b) (10), the immediate precursor
of § 202).
16The extent of the plan's provisions is encompassed in §216. 52 Stat. 895
(1938), 11 U.S.C. §616 (1964).
17 Section 169, 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1964).
18 Section 119, 52 Stat. 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 519 (1964); cf. In re Roger
Williams Bldg. Corp., 99 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 635
(1939) (dictum). See Hotz v. Federal Reserve Bank, 108 F.2d 216, 220 8th Cir.
1939):
In corporate reorganization proceedings a bankruptcy court can review purely
administrative orders entered in receivership proceedings involving the cor-
poration, and can make such orders as are deemed equitable for the protection
of obligations incurred by a receiver or prior trustee.
19 For an interesting study of one company's post-war reorganization, see Kaplan,
Lyne & Hurley, The Reorganization of the Walthain Watch Company: a Clinical
Study, 64 HAlv. L. REV. 1262 (1951) (two reorganizations of nine and four months).
20 Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d 582 (5th
Cir. 1966). Litigation added two years to the elapsed time. The petition was filed
June 22, 1962. Id. at 583. The order approving the amended plan was filed August 5,
1964. Record, p. 79, Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, supra.
21 Pines, The Inland Gas Corporation Case: Ai. Epic of Corporate Reorganization,
47 A.B.A.J. 1163 (1961). The reorganization-beginning with appointment of re-
ceiver on December 1, 1930 and ending with denial of certiorari on the final plan on
June 6, 1960--spanned equity receivership, § 77B and chapter X.
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The plan may also provide for the rejection of executory con-
tracts. Under section 216(4):
A plan of reorganization under this chapter-(4) may pro-
vide for the rejection of any executory contract except
contracts in the public authority.2
When a contract or lease is rejected, section 202 grants the injured
party the same remedy he would have if the contract had been re-
jected prior to the plan. Like section 116(1), this section is silent on
the procedure for trustee adoption of executory contracts, even though
it is well settled that the trustee is expected to adopt those contracts
which he considers profitable as well as those leases which he con-
siders valuable assets.'
The trustee submits the plan to the district court judge for his
approval, which is granted if the plan is "fair, equitable and feasible"
and conforms to statutory guidelines.24  The plan is then sent to
the creditors for their approval or objections (creditor suggestions
for the plan may be entertained by the trustee under section 167 (6)).25
This Comment will explore the problems raised by the statutory
silence on the procedure for adoption of contracts and will treat
the more specific problem of the extent to which pre-plan adoption
should bind the court at the time of plan confirmation.
Under equity practice existing prior to the first federal legislation
governing corporate reorganization, a receiver 2 6 was appointed to
direct the affairs of a failing company upon the filing of a creditor's
bill.27  The receiver was allowed a "reasonable time" to decide about
2252 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616(4) (1964).
23 There is authority for the proposition that the trustee has a duty to affirm
those contracts which are an asset to the debtor. Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting
Co., 214 Fed. 772, 773 (2d Cir. 1914) (receiver); Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis.
127, 352-53, 99 N.W. 909, 978 (1904). See Note, Abandonment of Assets by a
Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53 CoLum. L. REV. 415, 418 (1953).
24 Section 174, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1964). There may be
more than one plan submitted since creditors may tender plans under §§ 167(6) and
169. 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 567(6), 569 (1964). The statutory guidelines
to be applied to any plan sought to be submitted to creditors are found in § 216. 52
Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1964). The "fair and equitable" doctrine was
developed in Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) ; Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) ; and Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v.
Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942). It is an extensive subject and beyond
the scope of this Comment; the doctrine requires each class of creditors and share-
holders to receive the value of its interest in the debtor's assets before the next rank
below can participate. Thus the lowest rank, the common stockholders, retains no
interest whatever unless every superior class is compensated in full.
252 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567(6) (1964). The plan must be accepted
by two-thirds of the creditors in amount and one-half of the creditors in number.
Section 179, 52 Stat. 892 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §579 (1964).
26Although there are differences-e.g., the receiver did not get title to the
debtor's assets-the receiver roughly corresponds to the present trustee in reorgani-
zation. In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
27 The receivership was theoretically adverse litigation, though the debtor usually
prevailed upon a friendly creditor to file the bill to which the debtor would willingly
submit. See Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48
HAv. L. REV. 39, 41 (1934). For a general discussion of equity receivership, see
6 CoLulrE, BANKRUPTCY f 10.04 (14th ed. Moore 1965) [hereinafter cited as CoLLuI].
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the disposition of any executory contracts; 28 during this time, and
throughout the receiver's administration, the equity court stayed any
creditor's actions against the debtor. The length of the "reasonable
time" varied from case to case, but usually ran for about six months
from the time of the receiver's appointment.29 Once the receiver
determined that it was advantageous for the debtor to insist upon
performance of any contract or the continuance of any lease,"° he
would notify the other contracting party of his intention to perform
his part of the contract and to insist upon counter-performance.3' It
was possible, however, for a receiver to be held to have adopted a
contract through inaction or conduct inconsistent with its rejection.'
In order to correct abuse of the receivership procedure,33 and
28Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 515 (1896); United States Trust Co. v.
Wabash W. Ry., 150 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1893); In re Mallow Hotel Corp., 17 F.
Supp. 872, 873 (M.D. Pa. 1937); Pacific W. Oil Co. v. McDuffie, 69 F.2d 208, 213
(9th Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 568 (1934).
29 See authorities cited note 28 supra.
30 It is assumed throughout this Comment that, unless otherwise noted, the con-
tract or lease to be adopted is one in which the receiver or trustee can insist upon
counterperformance-i.e., that there are no provisions in the lease which give the
lessor or solvent party the right to terminate the contractual relationship upon an
adjudication of bankruptcy, insolvency, devolution of title, etc. Compare the straight
bankruptcy provisions of § 70b, 52 Stat. 880 (1930), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b)
(1964) which provide:
Unless a lease of real property expressly otherwise provides, a rejection of
the lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor does not
deprive the lessee of his estate. A general covenant or condition in a lease
that it shall not be assigned shall not be construed to prevent the trustee from
assuming the same at his election and subsequently assigning the same; but
an express covenant that an assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy
of a specified party thereto or of either party shall terminate the lease or give
the other party an election to terminate the same is enforceable.
By the force of § 102, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1964), this provision
is applicable to a chapter X reorganization. Finn v. Meighan, 325, U.S. 300, 302-03
(1945).
31 For a discussion of the means through which a receiver could effectuate an
adoption, or under what facts a court would find adoption, see Clark, Foley & Shaw,
Adoption. and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by Receivers, 46 HAv. L. Rxv. 1111,
1122-23 (1933). See text accompanying notes 73-74, 76 infra.
_311 re Mallow Hotel Corp., 17 F. Supp. 872 (M.D. Pa. 1937), dealt with
receivers who had never expressly adopted or attempted to reject leases of hotel
property, but who had used the premises for five years. The court held that "this
occupancy was far in excess of a reasonable time within which to elect to adopt
or reject the leases." The court cited another equity case, Menke v. Willcox, 275
Fed. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), which held:
In order to be bound, they must positively indicate their intention to take
[the lease] over. . . . That intention may be indicated by remaining in
enjoyment of the asset without dissent. . . . But in such cases it is only
because an assent may in fact be so implied.
Id. at 873. The court also cited Thomas v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 77 Fed. 667,
670 (S.D. Ohio 1896), which held that a receiver had "elected" to assume a lease
because he had remained in possession of the premises for three and one-half years.
33 Under receivership practice no plan was drawn up by the receiver for court
examination as is required under the present chapter X. Because receiverships were
in theory adverse litigation-the debtor was ostensibly dragged into court by his
creditors-creditors' "protective committees" representing different classes of creditor
interest were formed to bid for the assets of the debtor corporation pursuant to a
"plan" of purchase submitted by a majority of the creditors. Most often the "plan"
provided for little more than the issuance of stock in the reorganized corporation
1967]
942 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
to eliminate the problems created by ancillary receiverships, reform
of equity receiverships was begun in the early thirties, prompted by
the then severe economic conditions. Railroad reorganizations had
been placed under federal court control by section 77; 34 then, in 1934,
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act by enacting section 77B,"5
giving federal courts jurisdiction over, and supervision of, the re-
organization of business corporations, other than railroads already
covered by section 77.
Section 77B was passed to insure continuance of essentially the
same objectives that had been sought in equity receiverships. In a
report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives on
the original section 77B, it was said:
While the bill was framed with due regard for the present
and immediate prospective economic conditions, it is be-
lieved that an expansion of the opportunity for amicable
adjustment by debtor and creditors, under the supervision
and protection of the bankruptcy courts, and for holding
the property of the debtor intact with its operation disturbed
as little as practicable such as is provided in this bill, will
prove itself to be of permanently helpful assistance both to
distressed corporations and in line with the public interest. 6
Although the basic objectives of the statute paralleled those of equity
receiverships, reorganization trustees' powers were restricted: rejection
of executory contracts soon became the specific province of the
reorganization court.3 7
to the purchasing creditors in proportion to their claims. Since these majority
creditors already had large claims outstanding against the debtor, they could purchase
the debtor with only the cash needed to satisfy the dissident creditors and shareholders;
they could easily outbid any other potential buyers, and attempts by the courts to fix
prices did not succeed. The minority interests had to be content with the share
allocated them by the majority because of their weak bargaining position; the possi-
bility of prejudice to their rights is apparent. See Jackson, Receivership and Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings in United States Courts, SEN. Doc. No. 268, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
26 (1936); Friendly, supra note 27; Moore, Reorganizations Under Chapter X, 35
REF. J. 105, 108-09 (1961). See generally 6 CoL.IMR 10.04; Payne, The General Ad-
ministration of Equity Receiverships of Corporations, 31 YALE L.J. 685 (1922);
Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization, 17 CoLtm. L. Rxv. 523 (1917).
3447 Stat. 1474 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §205 (1964).
3548 Stat. 912 (1934). The passage of the bill seems also to have been Con-
gress' response to Supreme Court dicta which cast doubt upon the validity of the
consent equity receivership. See Friendly, supra note 27, at 41-45.
36 Quoted in In re Realty Associates Sec. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 787, 788 n.1 (E.D.
N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 156 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
7 Section 77B(c) (5) read in part: "[T]he judge . . . (5) may direct the
rejection of contracts of the debtor executory in whole or in part." 48 Stat. 916
(1934). Section 77B (b) (6) read: "A plan of reorganization within the meaning of
this section . . . (6) may reject contracts of the debtor which are executory in
whole or in part, including unexpired leases except contracts in the public authority."
48 Stat. 914 (1934).
Section 77B (c)(5), dealing with pre-plan rejection, was interpreted to require
court approval of any rejection, and the power to reject executory contracts was
[Vol.l15:937
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Section 77B is the immediate predecessor of chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, passed with the Chandler Act revisions of 1938. No
changes relevant to this study were made in the provisions empowering
court rejection of executory contractsW
Legislative comments accompanying the Chandler Act indicate an
intention to continue, and clarify, reorganization practice as it had
existed under section 77B. 9 An effort was made, however, to
integrate the Chandler Act revisions with other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act and, most importantly, with past equity practice.
Section 115 of chapter X provides that the reorganization court may
exercise all the powers, not inconsistent with the provisions
of this chapter, which a court of the United States would
effectively lodged in the court, not the trustee. Ip re Cheney Bros., 12 F. Supp. 605
(D. Conn. 1935). This case says nothing about trustee adoption:
Power to reject an executory contract under section 77B(c) is not lodged
in the debtor, nor in his trustee. Such power devolves exclusively upon the
judge, and there is no restriction as to the agencies by which that power may
be invoked. The exercise of such power is not necessarily predicated on a
petition of the debtor or trustee. Any party in interest may invoke it.
Id. at 608. (Emphasis added.) But see Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168, 174
(1941). Misinterpretation of the Cheney case is a source of many headaches. See
note 95 infra and accompanying text.
For concurrence in the view that § 77B leaves unaffected the procedures through
which the trustee adopts contracts, and that practice under § 77B is substantively the
same as under an equity receivership, at least as regards lessor rights, see In re
Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935):
The fact remains, however, that in substance the rights of the lessor and of
the debtor's estate in custody of the court are the same as where an insolvent's
assets are in [the] charge of a chancery receiver.
See also Ip re Schulte Retail Stores Corp., 22 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), and
cases cited therein. Note that the same considerations apply to both trustee and
debtor in possession. Ibid.
as The sections treating rejection both during reorganization administration and
in the plan are essentially the same in Chapter X as they were under section 77B.
The words "except contracts in the public authority" were added to § 77B (c) (5);
that section became § 116(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. 52 Stat 885 (1938), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1964). Section 77B (b) (6) became, without change,
§ 216(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616(4) (1964).
A sentence contained in § 77B (b) became § 202 of the Bankruptcy Act 52 Stat.
893 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §602 (1964). See 6 CoLLmR 110.07, at 87, 89; S. REP. No.
1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 24, 32-34 (1938).
39 See Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937) (statement of Congressman Chandler) :
While corporate reorganization, as now proposed under the bill, to a
great extent, rewrites the present act thereon [§ 77B], nevertheless all valu-
able features have been retained, together with many changes proven necessary
by experience. There will be noted . . . the attempt, as far as possible,
to remove the abuses of the present act, to speed up procedure, and to econo-
inize.
(Emphasis added.) For a general summary of the changes contemplated by the
Chandler Act, see id. at 3-8.
40 Particular notice should be taken of the distinction so clearly drawn between
reorganization and straight bankruptcy and the need for equitable flexibility in the
former.
The proceedings under the orthodox bankruptcy act resulted in the de-
struction of the enterprise and its liquidation. This is essentially different
from reorganization, which preserves the enterprise by readjusting its capital
structure to its impaired financial condition. The former procedure is adapted
to standardized conditions, and experience has proved the desirability of
1967]
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have if it had appointed a receiver in equity of the property
of the debtor .... 41
The net result of this legislative activity is that district courts now
have specific authority to reject executory contracts during the
estate's administration (section 116(1)), and in the reorganization
plan (section 216(4)). Through section 115 the court has been
granted the equitable powers of the older equity receiver courts to
fashion orders and decrees consistent with the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. It is well established that a chapter X court should follow
equitable principles just as its statutory and chancery antecedents did.'
rigidity of procedure, whereas reorganization procedure must be adapted to
varied situations necessitating flexibility. Most of the provisions and ma-
chinery having to do with liquidation are consequently entirely inappropriate
to the reorganization.
Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before the Subcommittee on the Revision of the National
Bankruptcy Act of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 37
(1938) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
In straight bankruptcy you have the same result in every case. The enter-
prise is destroyed, the assets converted into cash, the expenses are taken out,
and the balance is distributed among the creditors. It may be that in bank-
ruptcy some concerns are sold as a going concern. Usually business is
stopped and the assets are sent to the auctioneer. Every corporation is
treated the same way. A rigid inflexible procedure is consequently appro-
priate. Not so in reorganization. No two corporations are alike. No two
capital structures are the same. No two plans are alike. Consequently, you
must have a procedure flexible enough to meet the circumstances of each
particular case.
Id. at 92.
The drawn-out administration of receivership organizations had produced exorbi-
tant legal fees which nearly deprived the reorganization of any possible chance for
success in developing profitable operations. Senate Hearings 127-28; Swaine, Cor-
porate Reorganization Under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, 19 VA. L. REV. 317
(1933). See Douglas & Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J.
1003, 1046 (1933):
To delay the ultimate distribution of the securities or the cash under the plan
. . . is undesirable. Insofar as possible, administrative rules in this connection
should be devised to accelerate the consummation of the plan. . . . "[Rie-
ceiverships are always expensive luxuries." The Chancellor should shape
the decrees to meet the exigencies of the situation.
4152 Stat. 884 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 515 (1964). For an indication of the expected
scope of the power conferred on the district court by this section, see the debates on
court power to reject a contract held by a public authority. Senate Hearings 171-213.
And consider the following:
[T]here was enough protection in connection with contracts of that nature
for these reasons; it was within the power of the court to permit or not
to permit the rejection of a contract, and since the bankruptcy court was
given all the jurisdiction of a court of equity, we believed that the bank-
ruptcy court, acting as a court of equity, would have the power to refuse
permission to reject a contract which was affected with a large public interest.
Id. at 198.
In connection with the need for shortened proceedings and simple procedure, in
order to avoid debilitating administration expenses in the form of legal fees for counsel
and court officers, consider the following:
Judges and lawyers should not be required to devote their time (and thus
add delay and expense) to considering sections of the bankruptcy act which
are not and should not be applicable to a flexible reorganization procedure.
The principles and precedents of equity are well established.
Id. at 37.
42 See, e.g., Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165
(1946); In re General Stores Corp., 164 F. Supp. 130, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); aff'd
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In view of this history, the recent opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Texas Importing Co. v. Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico ' comes as somewhat of a surprise. The
court allowed a trustee in a chapter X reorganization to reject a
long-term lease pursuant to a plan of reorganization, despite the
trustee's adoption of the lease in a letter written to the lessor nearly
two years prior to the plan. Even more surprising are the reasons
given by the court. The court held that, although chapter X does
not mention the need for court approval of trustee adoption of execu-
tory contracts, judicial approval is required "by necessary implica-
tion." "4 It went further and rejected any application of the equitable
considerations applied in equity receiverships, holding that, since
adoption required judicial approval, which the trustee had failed to
gain, trustee assumption could not be implied from his affirmative
conduct.45 The court of appeals thus confirmed the plan, dismissing
the lessor's objections thereto.
The court's unspoken assumption must have been that had a
"binding" adoption occurred prior to the plan, the court would have
been unable to permit rejection of the lease in the plan. In fact, the
chapter of the Bankruptcy Act governing railroad reorganizations
explicitly allows just such action: the court is granted power to
reject executory contracts in the plan, regardless of whether they have
been adopted by the trustee during his administration." This pro-
vision is omitted in section 77B and its descendant-the present
chapter X. Without this grant of court power to reject "regardless,"
in part and rev'd in part sub norn. Ruskin v. Griffiths, 269 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1959).
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 947 (1960) ; In re Schafer's Bakeries, 155 F. Supp. 902, 913
(E.D. Mich. 1957). See also Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966) ; Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
One case has seen the unity of statutory treatment as a function of equitable
principles. In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 683 (1942):
In determining the extent of bankruptcy power, it matters little whether
we consider the precedents under the original act or under Sections 75, 77 or
77B, for the intent and purport of all bankruptcy legislation, so far as the
power to protect the estate is concerned, is largely declaratory of certain
recognized equitable principles, namely: the power of a court of equity to
protect property in its custody.
Accord, In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
43 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966).
44 Id. at 584.
45 Ibid.
46 The adoption of an executory contract or unexpired lease by the trustee or
trustees of a debtor shall not preclude a rejection of .uch contract or lease
in; a plan of reorganization approved hereunder, and any claim resulting from
such rejection shall not have priority over other claims against the debtor
because such contract or lease had been previously adopted.
Section 77(b), 49 Stat. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C. §205(b) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
The difference between the two statutes can be explained as a legislative policy
decision on the necessity of sacrificing some creditor-lessor rights in a reorganization
affecting the public need for continued railroad transportation, and the need to remove
even minor impediments in the path of a successful reorganization.
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a pre-plan adoption would seem to prevent a court from permitting
the rejection of the same contract in the plan. The Texas Importing
court must have agreed.
There are, unfortunately, no cases which clearly explain what
effect pre-plan adoption has on the power of a court to reject a lease
or contract in a plan pursuant to section 216(4). Further, there is
no case which can be considered precedent for Texas Importing; 48 it
presented a problem of first impression in an area in which judicial
interpretation of the applicable statutes had already been confused.
49
Assuming the court was correct in its assumption that pre-plan
adoption precludes rejection in the plan, the question is why court
approval should be considered necessary for an adoption when chapter
X does not require it. The reason offered by the Texas Importing
court is that
if a trustee, without authorization by the court, can assume
or adopt such a contract, or by conduct which would con-
stitute an estoppel between private persons, could bar the
court from exercising its statutory power to authorize the
rejection of such a contract, then the power to determine that
such a contract should or should not be rejected would be
4 It could hardly be supposed that a court faced with Texas Importing's facts
would find that an "adoption" of a lease had occurred two years ago, and then permit
its rejection in a plan absent statutory authority-the inequitable treatment in con-
doning unconscionable trustee action is patent. Thus, the only way the Texas Im1-
porting court could have permitted rejection of the lease in the plan was to find that
the lease had never been effectively adopted. Possible reasons for the court's action
are discussed at note 107 infra and accompanying text.
Collier gives hypothetical treatment to the problem of a plan's rejection of an
already adopted executory contract, and decides that a court probably should not be
permitted to reject in those circumstances, grounding his argument, however, on
judicial approval as a requisite for effective adoption. 6 Coiaxa f 3.24, at 605-06.
The Texas Importing court's continual citation to Collier indicates that it agreed
with this analysis.
There is a reported case which suggests that prior adoption precludes rejection
in the plan. In In re Davega Stores Corp., BANIC. L. REP. 60777 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
a trustee renegotiated a lower rental of property occupied by the debtor on a twenty-
five year lease while a chapter XI arrangement petition was pending; the new lease
was approved by the court. Thereafter the petition was amended to comply with
chapter X requirements and the trustee sought to reject the lease. Judge Bonsal held
that a contract once accepted could not thereafter be rejected. Cf. Grief Brothers
Cooperage Co. v. Mullinux, 264 Fed. 391 (8th Cir. 1920).
48 The cases cited in note 47 supra are technically distinguishable in that adoption
was effectuated through a court order in both instances. However, under the analysis
presented in this Comment, it is submitted that an equitable adoption can properly
be found, under some circumstances, which will operate to preclude the contract's
later rejection. See Hotz v. Federal Reserve Bank, 108 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1939)
(prior express adoption by equity receiver held binding upon § 77B reorganization).
Further, no case has been found where an express adoption was later repudiated by
a chapter X court.
49 See, e.g., Wiemeyer v. Koch, 152 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1945) (court applied
sixty-day limit of § 70b to a reorganization long after that portion of § 70b had been
held inconsistent with and inapplicable to chapter X) ; I-n re Petrol Terminal Corp.,
120 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1954) (same). See also In re Public Ledger Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 1008, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947) (confusing
bankruptcy and reorganization).
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lodged in the trustee. We think no such result was
intended.5"
This statement runs counter to the legislative and common-law history
of reorganization. It can be argued that just such a result was indeed
intended; trustee decision-making was to be reviewed only when
rejection was attempted. In addition to the statutory history discussed
above,5 there are still other considerations which support a reading
contrary to that of the court.
First, the appointed trustee must be "disinterested." " The
obvious purpose of this provision is to gain not only the exercise of
the objective business judgment needed to insure the operation of the
debtor for its own profit, but to provide an impartial investigator of
the debtor's affairs should mismanagement be discovered. 3 Constant
review of those decisions which merely continue past business dealings
and keep operations intact is not imperative. In addition, one clear
reason for requiring judicial approval of rejection is to guard against
capricious discarding of contracts. An early attempt was made to use
a chapter X proceeding as a means of disposing of burdensome labor
contracts.54 That use of chapter X was quickly denied by the courts,
clearly illustrating the need for such a safeguard.
Further, there is a marked difference between chapter X provisions
empowering a reorganization court to reject executory contracts " and
the comparable chapter VII provisions in straight bankruptcy.56 The
50 360 F.2d at 584.
51 See notes 26-42 mtpra and accompanying text.
02 See notes 5-6 mpra and accompanying text. While it is true that this con-
sideration is lacking in those cases involving liabilities of less than $250,000 where
the debtor has been left in possession, in the facts before the Texas Importing court
this distinction was not relevant, especially in the view taken by this Comment's
proposed alternate procedure.
The absence of a trustee should also not affect this analysis because the debtor
usually remains in possession only in those cases where the business' financial diffi-
culty stems from factors not wholly within the debtor's control and where his knowl-
edge, judgment and integrity provide sufficient certainty of successful business rehabili-
tation. Further, the retention of the debtor in possession (as well as the appointment
of the trustee) may be challenged by objecting parties. Section 162, 52 Stat. 889
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 562 (1964). And finally, it has been argued that the debtor's
interest in preserving the corporation's equity is sufficient interest to ensure the
maintenance of a successful reorganization. Senate Hearings 39.
63 See note 8 supra.
r4In re Mamie Conti Gowns Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
65 Section 116(1), 52 Stat. 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1964). For a good
analysis of the power of rejection in the Bankruptcy Act, see Silverstein, Rejection
of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. CHi. L. REv. 467
(1964).
66 Section 70b, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § l10b (1964), reads
in part: The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract, including an
unexpired lease of real property, within sixty days after the adjudication or
within thirty days after the qualification of the trustee, whichever is later, but
the court may for cause shown extend or reduce the time. Any such contract
or lease not assumed or rejected within that time shall be deemed to be
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latter provisions require a trustee in bankruptcy to elect to adopt or
reject the executory contracts held by the debtor within sixty days of
adjudication, with a conclusive presumption of rejection if no action is
taken or consideration given under the contract during that time.57
Both the time limit and presumption of rejection of chapter VII have
been held to be inconsistent with and thus inapplicable to chapter X.58
Juxtaposing these two sections highlights a distinction which needs
further elaboration.
Adoption of an executory contract or lease in straight bankruptcy
can easily mean the dissipation of whatever cash reserves are on
hand, since the debtor's estate is thereby obligated to pay rent, or its
consideration on the contract, from the date of petition filing.59 Pay-
ments under any adopted lease or contract in bankruptcy or reorgani-
zation become an "expense of administration" and must be satisfied
rejected. . . . A trustee shall file, within sixty days after adjudication or
within thirty days after he has qualified, whichever is later, . . . a statement
under oath showing which, if any, of the contracts of the bankrupt are execu-
tory in whole or part, including unexpired leases of real property, and which,
if any, have been rejected by the trustee.
This provision is also silent as to how a contract or lease is to be adopted.
But see In re Forgee Metal Prods., Inc., 229 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1956), which held
that the bankruptcy trustee had assumed a sales contract even though there was no
formal expression by the trustee that he was assuming it, but merely his tacit approval
of the referee's completion of the debtor's portion of the contract. Cf. In re Public
Ledger Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 765 n.1 (3d Cir. 1947), discussed at note 77 infra.
Section 70b keeps uncertainty and delay to a minimum by letting the bankrupt's
creditors know where they stand very quickly; the notice of bankruptcy also informs
creditors that they cannot expect too much in payment. Thus, it has been suggested
that this provision permits the trustee to avoid rejecting many contracts upon which
the debtor owes money for goods and services, thereby freeing the estate from a
time-consuming administrative burden which would significantly add to the costs of
administration. Silverstein, .upra note 55, at 474.
It is submitted that this analysis should be turned on its head and applied to
chapter X: there is no need to require court approval to validate a trustee's adoption
of many small executory contracts of obvious necessity to the business. To require
approval for adoption, as has been done in Texas Importing, unnecessarily lengthens,
and increases the costs of, administration of the estate. Cf. In re Avorn Dress Co.,
Inc., 78 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 1935). See note 14 supra.
57 In the Matter of Gravure Paper & Board Corp., 234 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1956)
(trustee held to have abandoned leases by failing to adopt within sixty days of ad-
judication, and his purported sale of them after sixty days was invalid); In re
Northern Ind. Oil Co., 180 F.2d 669 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950)
(trustee abandoned leases by failing to adopt them within statutory period); In re
Pagliaro, 99 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd sub nor. Costello v. Golden, 196
F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1952).
58 Title Ins. & Guaranty v. Hart, 160 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947) ; In re M & S Amusement Enterprises, 122 F. Supp. 364, 365 (D.
Del. 1954). But see cases cited note 49 supra. Section 102, 52 Stat 883 (1938),
11 U.S.C. § 502 (1964), provides that the- provisions of chapters I-VII apply to
chapter X unless "inconsistent or in conflict" with the provisions of chapter X. That
portion of § 70b held inapplicable is quoted in note 56 supra.
r59 The same rule obtains for a chapter X adoption. In the Matter of North
Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co., 166 F. Supp. 29, 31-32 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nora. 120
Wall Associates v. Schilling, 266 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1959); It re Schulte Retail
Stores Corp., 22 F. Supp. 612, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See also In the Matter of
Walmer Screen Printing Co., 177 F. Supp. 684, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). For a good
explanation of this doctrine, see In re Chase Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288,
289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
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prior to any creditor's claims.f ° The detriment to unsecured creditors
in bankruptcy, whose claims can usually be satisfied only from liquid
assets, is apparent. Reorganization, on the other hand, contemplates
maintenance and rehabilitation of an operating business." Since
ultimately profitable operations are expected to result from the re-
organization, and creditors' claims must be fairly treated in the
court-examined plan, pre-plan adoption in reorganization does not
present the dangers of an adoption in straight bankruptcy. One would
thus expect that in a reorganization, contracts and leases would be
adopted by the trustee in order to prevent defaults and to maintain
a competitive position; in straight bankruptcy the expectation is
exactly the opposite, since all trustee activities point to termination
and liquidation of the business. 2
0 Section 64(a), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
61 For cases drawing the same distinction, see Petition of Portland Elec. Power
Co., 162 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947); Consolidated
Gas Elecm Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799, 805 (4th
Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663 (1937); In re Realty Associates Sec. Corp.,
54 F. Supp. 787, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1944). See note 40 supra.
It can be argued that, prior to a determination that reorganization can succeed,
straight bankruptcy and reorganization both have straight bankruptcy characteristics,
since the chapter X attempt can easily wind up in bankruptcy, and should receive
similar analysis with respect to these provisions until such determination is made.
Cf. In re Neville Island Glass Co., 78 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Pa. 1948). But cf. In re
Public Ledger Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947).
2An opposite presumption in reorganization is confirmed by Consolidated Gas
Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799, 805 (4th Cir.
1936) :
Section 77B, on the other hand, does not contemplate the surrender and sale
of the debtor's assets, but rather the transfer of the property, including execu-
tory contracts and leasehold estates not affirmatively rejected, to a reorganized
body for the continuance of the business. An executory contract, there-
fore, remains in force in a proceeding under section 77B until it is rejected,
and unless rejected, it passes with other property of the debtor to the reor-
ganized corporation.
(Emphasis added.)
And in contradistinction to chapter X's permissive trustee reporting requirements,
note 15 mtpra, straight bankruptcy's § 70b also requires the trustee to file a statement
covering executory contracts he expects to reject. Note 56 supra; see note 11 supra.
If the bankruptcy trustee fails to do this, he may cause a loss to the estate, because
of the automatic rejection provision. In re Gravure Paper & Board Corp., 234 F.2d
928 (3d Cir. 1956) (automatic rejection held to occur despite sale of lease at public
auction more than sixty days after adjudication). No such result can occur in
chapter X.
In addition, consider the following comparison:
In a Chapter XI the contact between the court and the debtor is extremely
close and the opportunity to exercise firm administrative control is unlimited.
The entire structure of the Chapter is built on the continuation of the debtor
in the possession of his property ...
Herzog, Reorganications and Arrangezents Under Chapters X and XI: Problems
of Administration From the Standpoint of the Court, 35 REF. J. 113 (1961). The
same writer draws the following sketch of the predominant characteristics of chap-
ter X:
[Chapter X] represents a distillation of the experiences derived from all the
earlier methods--common-law settlements, bankruptcy compositions, equity
receiverships, and its immediate precursor, Section 77B. The point I seek
to emphasize is that disinterested administrative assistance to the court is
the keynote, and freed from the shackles of many purely administrative func-
tions, the Judge can effectively perform his essential function, that is, to solve
a complicated financial and legal problem, and to consider and compare the
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In conclusion, there is nothing in chapter X which is inconsistent
with reading sections 116(1) and 216(4) to allow the trustee to make
the initial determination of an executory contract's disposition, and to
require the trustee to seek court approval only when he rejects an
executory contract, and thereby directly and immediately damages the
interests of other parties.'
In support of its contention that adoption "should not be implied
from the conduct of the trustee or debtor in possession, but should be
the result only of judicial consideration," the Fifth Circuit in Texas
Importing cited a footnote in Collier on Bankruptcy."4 The footnote
cited states, in fact, that adoption should not be the result of inaction
on the part of the trustee; it does not say that express trustee adoption,
as in the Texas Importing case, is inconsistent with chapter X
philosophy. Not only is the footnote inapposite, but its denial of the
applicability of receivership practice is limited, and does not clearly
include other aspects of estoppel or equitable doctrines in general.
Further, Collier supports his contention that judicial consideration
should be necessary for adoption with a single citation: the district
court opinion in the case of In re Public Ledger Inc.6" Initially in a
chapter X reorganization, the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt
several months after the initial petition for reorganization had been
filed and approved. Two labor unions presented claims to the district
court for money allegedly due their members because, during the few
months of attempted reorganization, the trustee had allegedly adopted
labor contracts which included provisions for vacation and severance
pay. It happened that these contract provisions became effective
during the reorganization, becoming in effect, a new contract arising
during reorganization. The district court held that the trustees had
never expressly adopted the contracts and stated that the contract
could not have been adopted by the trustee without specific court
merits of various plans and approve for submission to creditors only those
it finds to be fair and sound.
Id. at 117. (Emphasis added.) This is not to suggest that court supervision in
chapter X is not extensive. Compare 6 COLLiFR 1 3.23, at 575 n.40, discussed at text
accompanying note 64 infra.
63 A wise trustee will of course seek court approval whenever relatively large
sums of money are involved with respect to cash assets on hand. See note 8 supra.
Cf. Il re Schenectady Ry. Co., 93 F. Supp. 67, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) :
Reorganization contemplates the control of the debtor's assets by the Court,
and it would seem to follow that the Trustee could not make such obligation
his own which might seriously encumber the assets without the consent and
approval of the Court.
This is not to say that small contractual obligations could not be adopted without
court approval. In fact, were the trustee required to petition the court and follow
the procedure of hearings and court order for every adoption, the administrative
process would be unnecessarily lengthened and made more costly. See note 14 supra.
The trustee will of course seek approval whenever the other party to the contract
objects. See It re Childs Co., 64 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), discussed at text
accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
04 6 COLLIER 3.23, at 575 n.40.
65 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rez'd, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947).
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authorization-lacking court approval, had any express trustee adop-
tion been attempted, it would be "invalid." "" In support of this dictum
the district court cited a straight bankruptcy case,67 authority in-
appropriate to chapter X.
Standing alone, the district court opinion is questionable au-
thority for Collier's proposition. Further, as noted by the Texas
Importing court, Public Ledger was reversed on appeal."' The
Texas Importing court read the Public Ledger court of appeals opinion
as holding that prior court authorization had been given to the trustee
to adopt these contracts. But such was not the case. To be sure,
the court of appeals in Public Ledger did cite the order of appointment
instructing the trustee "to manage, operate and conduct the business
. . .and to employ and/or discharge, and fix the compensation of all
employees . *.".. 6" But this order is standard reorganization pro-
cedure; it is, in fact, nearly identical to the corresponding order in
the Texas Importing proceedings." Such a court order merely au-
thorizes trustee retention of the necessary work force and does not
indicate "judicial consideration," the point for which it is cited.
Even more importantly, the provisions in the contract which the
court of appeals held to have been adopted were not within the scope of
the trustee's powers as enumerated by the court order of appointment:
section 7 of the Public Ledger trustee's orders of appointment limited
his authority to grant compensation to employees to "the paying of
current wages." 71 Severance pay could not be considered "current
wages"; in awarding severance pay, the court must have held the
contract to have been adopted without prior court approval.
Not only did the Texas Importing court misread Public Ledger,
but it ignored paragraphs of that opinion which specifically referred to
adoption of executory contracts implied from trustee conduct. The
court of appeals in Public Ledger quoted with approval the definitions
of "adoption" contained in a law review article on receiver's adoption
and rejection of executory contracts.7 One quoted definition reads:
66 63 F. Supp. at 1016.
W7Erie Malleable Co. v. Standard Parts Co., 299 Fed. 82 (6th Cir. 1924).
68 it re Public Ledger Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947).
69 Id. at 764, 766.
70 That the Trustee appointed herein be and he is hereby authorized and
directed, subject to such supervision and control by this Court as this Court
may exercise by further Orders herein, to conduct the business and manage,
maintain and keep in proper condition and repair, the assets, properties, and
business of the Debtor, wherever situated; and to employ and discharge and
to fix the compensation of all managers, superintendents, agents, servants and
employees . ...
Record, p. 31, Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Record].
7163 F. Supp. at 1012 n.7.
72 Clark, Foley & Shaw, srupra note 31.
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[Adoption is] "a situation in which a receiver . . . acts in
such a way with reference to a contract . . . that fairness
to the solvent party requires that the consequences of
adoption be attributed to his action." "
The court of appeals in Public Ledger also quoted from the same
article that " 'some action by [a] receiver may be held to amount to
adoption despite an intention to the contrary.' " " The court in
Texas Importing also ignored a footnote in the Public Ledger opinion
in which the court quoted section 70(b) of chapter VII,'7 not then
held inapplicable to chapter X, and continued:
It should be noted that the act does not specify the
manner of acceptance of an executory contract ....
Acceptance may be by conduct as well as by writing or oral
statement.
76
The court of appeals in Public Ledger specifically reversed the entire
district court decision, and held that the trustees had adopted the
contract, not expressly, but by conduct implying adoption." The
final decree demanded full compliance with the contract's terms during
the time the parties acted in adherence thereto. The court of appeals'
decision in Public Ledger correctly applied equitable principles con-
sistent with the facts presented and does not support the proposition
for which it was cited in Texas Importing.
The Public Ledger decision is even more noteworthy, however,
because of the final adjudication of bankruptcy.78 By holding vacation
and severance pay ("a considerable sum" 79) to be an expense of
administration, the claims of the unsecured creditors in Public Ledger
must have been severely prejudiced. No such severe effects would
SIn re Public Ledger Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 767 (3d Cir. 1947).
74 Ibid.
75 See note 58 supra and accompanying text. It should be noticed that the appli-
cation of § 70b to the reorganization then before the Public Ledger court of appeals
reads additional court supervision into reorganization procedure. A court faced
with facts suggesting trustee adoption without "judicial consideration" after § 70b
was held inapplicable, can rely with even greater certainty upon Public Ledger for
the proposition that binding adoption can be "implied" from trustee actions. The
more complete separation of straight bankruptcy from reorganization yields greater
flexibility for trustee handling of the debtor's business contracts and leases. It also
means that courts should be more willing to apply equitable considerations to chapter X
adoptions.
76 161 F.2d at 765 n.1. (Emphasis added.) Cf. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190
F.2d 994, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1951). Trustees in chapter X reorganization petitioned
to reject debtor's assignment to bank of expected proceeds from contract to sell
mayonnaise. At the time of this petition, the trustees had gone ahead with the
manufacture and delivery of mayonnaise. The court held that this amounted to
assumption of the contract. See In re Forgee Metal Prods., Inc., 229 F.2d 799
(3d Cir. 1956), discussed at note 56 supra.
77 161 F.2d at 767.
78 Id. at 765.
79 Id. at 771.
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have followed had adoption been found in Texas Importing. ° Despite
the hardship to unsecured creditors, the court in Public Ledger did
hold severance pay to be owed to the unions by the then bankrupt
corporation, in effect a finding of binding adoption even though
implied. Read carefully, then, Public Ledger indicates not only that
equitable considerations are as applicable to chapter X as they were to
section 77B and equity receiverships, but that, had those considera-
tions been properly applied in Texas Importing, adoption could have
been found in that case even more easily than in Public Ledger.
In re Schenectady Ry.' was also cited by the Texas Importing
court as direct support for its contention that the doctrine of estoppel
should not be applied to chapter X adoption of contracts. Schenectady
dealt with a labor contract which required "the debtor to make pension
payments during the balance of the lives of the pensioned employees." '
The question before the court was whether the debtor was required to
make any of those payments to the petitioning unions. The record,
noted the court, was "entirely silent as to affirmative action on the
part of the trustee which would indicate that the labor contract had
been adopted . . ." g---a fact which makes this case distinguishable
from Texas Importing. The opinion implied that it considered
judicial approval necessary for adoption by noting the trustee's failure
to petition the court. But the court continued:
While Chapter 10 lays down a scheme for the conduct
of affairs of financially embarrassed corporations to the end
that the going value of the assets may be preserved, re-
organization has its practical aspects and the statutory scheme
does not entirely foreclose them. [The court then found that
the trustee had neither affirmed nor rejected the contract.]
No judicial decision is cited which might be termed a
precedent in this case and it would seem that the determini-
tion of the question would depend upon the particular facts
involved. Equitable considerations dictate that under the
circumstances existing in this case the payment of the monthly
pensions are a part of operating expenses and as such should
be paid by trustee during that period that the parties know-
ingly conform to the contract 8 4
Two factors in the decision should be noticed: the case was decided
upon equitable grounds (even though the facts did not reveal any
So See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
8193 F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1950).
2 Id. at 69.
83 Ibid.
s4 Id. at 70. (Emphasis added.)
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intention to adopt), and the court let the intentions of the parties
control the effect to be given the contract. Both of these considera-
tions indicate that Schenectady would dictate a contrary result in
Texas Importing; they illustrate little concern with a need for judicial
consideration.
A case unnoticed by the Texas Importing court is Black v.
Richfield Oil Corp., 5 in which reorganization proceedings were held
under section 77B. The defendant, Richfield, had purchased a re-
organized company through a plan in which Richfield agreed to
assume some existing liabilities acquired through the reorganization
trustee, "including such contracts as had been assumed by the Court." 86
The plaintiff alleged that a licensing agreement had been omitted from
a contract which, it further alleged, was held by the reorganized
company. However, the disputed contract was "never affirmed by
the court and was never specifically assumed under the reorganization
agreement." '7 The court concluded:
The evidence clearly indicates that the trustee clearly recog-
nized the agreement and the conduct of the defendant cor-
poration establishes that it too assumed the said licensing
agreement had been affirmed by the court and that they were
bound by the terms of the same. For the purposes of this
opinion, I have acted on the assumption that the new
corporation specifically assumed the said agreement and is
bound by the terms thereof, to the same force and effect
as if the said agreement had been specifically affirmed by the
court in accordance with the usual procedure under § 77B."
s
The reference to the "usual procedure" is unclear. It no doubt refers
to the usual catch-all provision in a plan whereby all executory con-
tracts are adopted, and a few enumerated contracts are rejected, as
was done in the Texas Importing proceedings.89 In any event, the
absence of adherence to the "usual procedure" did not prevent the
court from holding the parties to a contract which had not received
judicial consideration, but was considered adopted by the contracting
parties.
85 41 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Cal. 1941), aff'd, 146 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 867 (1945).
861d. at 991.
87 Ibid.
88Id. at 991-92. (Emphasis added.)
89 All executory contracts shall be accepted by the Continuing and Reorganized
Company, with the exception of the real property lease upon the premises
occupied by the home office of the Debtor, . • . wherein Atlas Sewing Centers,
Inc., is the Lessee, and the Texas Importing Company is the Lessor. This
executory contract shall be rejected ....
Record, pp. 60-61. Accord, In re American R.R., 110 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1952),
aff'd, 202 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1953); cf. Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores,
19 N.Y.S.2d 981, 984 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd on other grouods, 260 App. Div. 64, 20
N.Y.S.2d 739, appeal dismissed, 286 N.Y. 476, 36 N.E2d 669 (1941).
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In conclusion, there is case authority for finding binding adoption
even where there is no court consideration of the executory contract.
Further, numerous courts have searched the facts before them for
evidence of estoppel, implying in several instances that estoppel could
arise on a set of facts stronger than those before themf 0 Equitable
considerations have consistently been used in reorganization and should
continue to be applied to the trustee's administration.
As the basis of its finding that the lease was not legally assumed,
the Texas Importing court held that, to be effective, trustee adoption
requires court approval. In support of this contention it cited three
cases: In re Schenectady Ry.,a' In re Childs Co.02 and In re Walker?3
Schenectady, as noted earlier, is equivocal on this point. Although
the court said that no rejection or adoption took place under its facts,
the contract was given full effect for the period of time that both
parties adhered to it.
In re Childs dealt with petitions filed by a landlord seeking
termination of leases held by the debtor; the trustee cross-petitioned
for approval to assume the leases. One of the grounds upon which
the landlord relied was trustee disaffirmance of the leases through his
attorney. The court held that statements of an intention to reject
unless the rent were lowered constituted "arm's-length negotiations";
it found that "the facts relied upon are not strong enough for me to
say that the Trustee is estopped from coming to Court and asking
authority to assume the leases." "
However, the Childs court interpreted section 77B practice to
require court authorization of trustee adoption as well as rejection.
This is simply incorrect.95 The court's conclusion that chapter X's
section 116(1) should be interpreted in the same way as was section
wi0t re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 683 (1942) (facts fell short of showing estoppel, trustee dissatisfaction exhibited
within five months) ; Hotz v. Federal Reserve Bank, 108 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1939) ;
In re Rochester Shipbuilding Co., 32 F. Supp. 98, 100-01 (W.D.N.Y. 1940) (facts
insufficient because no clear intention to adopt, trustee acting within a "reasonable
time'). But see In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 9-11 (7th Cir. 1942)
(Evans, J., dissenting) (facts did show adoption).
M193 F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1950).
9264 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nonr., 415 Fifth Ave. Co. v. Finn, 146
F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1944).
93 93 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1937). In re M & S Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 122
F. Supp. 364 (D. Del. 1954), also cited by the Texas Importing court, presents similar
issues in reverse: the debtor is petitioning to reject a contract. Consequently the
case falls squarely within the Cheney rationale, note 37 supra, and cannot be con-
sidered authority on the question of adoption.
94 64 F. Supp. at 287. As the Childs court itself noted, this examination of the
facts was rendered "more or less moot" by the trustee's statutory limitation: "In as
much as the Trustee did not have the power to reject a lease, I doubt very much
that his acts and declarations would have the effect of rejection." Id. at 286.
95 See note 37 supra. Curiously enough, the Texas Importing court relies upon
the Childs case which misread the Cheney case, even though the Texas Importing
court itself correctly applies the Cheney case. 360 F.2d at 584.
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77B (c) (5) is entirely correct, but the conclusion should have been
that case authority under section 77B requires court consideration only
of rejection. Even though the court appears to fail to perceive a
rather basic distinction, 6 and even if its misreading of section 77B
were conceded, there is no reason to suppose that Childs is authority
for requiring court approval for adoption, since the trustee, desiring to
retain the lease, had no choice but to seek the court's assistance. He
had already been dragged into court by a lessor who wanted to
terminate the lease; approval to adopt was the trustee's defense and
counterclaim. Any statements by the court indicating a requirement
of court approval are clearly dicta.
Another case cited by the Texas Importing court which states
that adoption without court approval is ineffective is In re Walker.97
That case concerned the right of a landlord to dispossess the debtor
pursuant to provisions in a lease granting the lessor a right of reentry
upon several conditions subsequent; insolvency and devolution of title
were two of the conditions held to be satisfied. The question of lessor
waiver of that right arose because he had accepted payments from the
trustee for use of the premises during the "reasonable time" of the
trustee's early administration. The court could have decided the
case on a close examination of the record-there was no expression
of an intention to adopt, no expression of lessor waiver of the right
of reentry. The cases hold that trustee payment of a reasonable sum
of money, an expense of administration, for "use and occupation" is
required of the trustee using premises under lease, up until such time
as he elects to adopt or reject.9 (The consequences of rejection have
been set out above. 9) If he adopts, the terms of the lease must be
96 While the court clearly has jurisdiction to decide disputes between the trustee
and lessor-it is, to be sure, the court which has "the last say," 64 F. Supp. at 286,
on any disagreement over adoption-that is not the same thing as invalidating a
consensual agreement to continue the lease merely because that adoption did not
receive judicial consideration. The court's power and jurisdiction to decide disputes
over adoption should not be confused with a sweeping court requirement that such
jurisdiction always be invoked by the trustee even where there is no disagreement
over whether the lease should be, or can be, adopted.
97 93 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1937).
98 In the Matter of North Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co., 166 F. Supp. 29, 31-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub nomn., 120 Wall Associates v. Schilling, 266 F.2d 548 (2d
Cir. 1959); It re Schulte Retail Stores Corp., 22 F. Supp. 612, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1937). See also In the Matter of Walmer Screen Printing Co., 177 F. Supp. 684,
685 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). For a good explanation of this doctrine, see In re Chase
Commissary Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
As in equity receiverships, the "reasonable time" rule would appear to be applicable
to chapter X adoption since an executory contract can be rejected in the plan, often
a considerable length of time from the time of petition-filing. Bait see In re Schulte
Stores Corp., 22 F. Supp. 612, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
Rejections are more closely watched by the courts:
In bankruptcy reorganizations, the initial orders generally expressly preserve
the right of rejection and prescribe a period, usually six months, within
which it may be exercised. Extensions are frequently granted for further
periods.
In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
683 (1942).
99 Text accompanying note 15 supra.
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complied with, i.e., the estate is liable for full rent from the time of
petition approval until the corporation is finally reorganized. °0  The
facts of Walker place it squarely within the line of decisions so holding;
the case could have been disposed of by a close examination of trustee-
lessor intentions.'' But Judge Learned Hand went further and stated
that a trustee "is forbidden to affirm the lease without order of the
court, and the payment of rent as rent would be as much an affirmance,
if lawful, as is the lessor's acceptance." 102
The Texas Importing court accepted this statement without any
examination of the clear factual distinctions between Texas Importing
and Walker. There was no express adoption in Walker, merely pay-
ment of money due for use of the premises, which trustees are
obligated to pay. Waiver was asserted against the lessor for acceptance
of money for four months, a "reasonable" length of time showing no
trustee intention to adopt under established case law; in Texas
Importing, estoppel was asserted against the trustee for payment of
less than full rent for twenty months, clearly not a "reasonable" length
of time in view of both the express adoption and the deadline set for
a tentative plan by the Texas Importing court. 03 Walker does not
100 See cases cited note 98 supra.
101 Just such an approach was taken in In re Schulte Retail Stores Corp., 22 F.
Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), where the lessor also petitioned to dispossess. The
debtor contended that acceptance of one month's payment of rent constituted a waiver
of the lessor's right to re-enter since such right had by then expired under the terms
of the lease. In granting the lessor's petition, the court said:
When property of a . . . [lessor] is thus put to use of a distressed debtor,
and the price of its use is capable of being called either rent or payment for
use and occupation, it should not lie wholly within the power of the debtor
to make choice of the denominating quality . . . . [I]n the absence of clear
and convincing proof that the lessor intended to waive the breach in the lease,
it should not be considered to have done so.
Id. at 615. (Emphasis added.) For other cases clearly placing upon the trustee the
burden of initiating action with respect to the lease, see Hotz v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 108 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co.
v. United Rys. & Elec. Co, 85 F.2d 799, 805 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S.
663 (1937). See also Moore v. Risley, 287 Fed. 10, 13 (9th Cir. 1923), for a set
of facts similar to Childs where a receiver, contrary to the referee's expectations,
did try to take advantage of the lessor-equity prevailed.
10293 F.2d at 283. The latter part of Judge I-and's statement, though admittedly
obscure, can probably be taken to mean that if court approval is required to make
an adoption binding, payment of rent by the trustee could never, by itself, constitute
an adoption of the contract And if payment of rent by the trustee could not, without
court approval, constitute adoption, neither could acceptance by the lessor.
103 Under the orders of appointment, the trustee was instructed to report to the
court by August 24, 1962, "as to the advisability" of any adoption or rejection of
executory contracts held by the debtor. The record, noted the court, without ex-
planation as to why notice was taken of that fact, failed to disclose any compliance
therewith. However, under § 12 of the orders, the trustee was directed "to formulate
and present a proposed plan of reorganization to this Court by August 24, 1962"-the
same date on which the report on executory contracts was due. It can thus be inferred
that by August 24-two months after the petition was filed-the court expected to
be able to decide whether reorganization was feasible. Trustee ratification of the
lease occurred in a letter dated September 20, 1962-a month after the court should
have known whether to proceed with reorganization. There is no evidence in the
record of any extension of the time limit for submission of a tentative plan; nor is
there any evidence that such a determination could not have been made, or for that
matter, was in fact made, by the specified time. The only clear inference to be drawn
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treat the same problem as was presented to the Texas Imnporting court
and should not have been considered controlling.
A factor ignored by the Fifth Circuit is that both parties to the
lease considered it to have been adopted. The acceptance of less than
full rent under the lease is easily viewed as a sign of lessor co-
operation. 104 One case specifically dealt with a cooperative lessor who
reduced the monthly rental upon a receiver's adoption of the lease. 05
The court there found an added equity for allowing lessor collection
of the full rent for the term of the lease where the trustee abandoned
and did not use the premises during the later months of the re-
organization proceedings. And, in a state equity receivership, a lessor
was given a preferred claim for a part of the back rentals allowed to
accumulate because of his and other creditors' cooperation with the
debtor." 6 It follows from all that has been said that the very least
the Texas Inmporting court could have done was to make provision in
the plan for full rent during the two years of trustee-lessor adherence
to the contract.
It may be that the Texas Importing court was presented with
facts which raised doubts about the cleanliness of the lessor's hands. 0 7
is that any possible trustee failure to report on executory contracts did not impede
the reorganization proceedings, and should carry little weight in deciding the case.
Cf. Hotz v. Federal Reserve Bank, 108 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Consolidated
Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663 (1937).
The plan which called for the lease's rejection was filed on May 8, 1964. Record,
p. 40. Thus the lessor, who had been notified on September 20, 1962, that its lease
with the debtor was considered ratified, was misled for nearly twenty months. There
is little doubt that the elements of equitable estoppel are present:
The vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another
to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person
to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.
This remedy is always so applied as to promote the ends of justice.
Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1880). See cases cited note 101 supra.
The trouble with the court's conclusion that the lessor can always force an
election through petition to the court, 360 F.2d at 584-85, is that it ignores the
essential facts of the case before it: the lessor had already been assured that its
lease with the debtor was considered worth retaining. The lessor was thereby
effectively precluded from initiating any more aggressive action he might have taken
had he thought his lease was of doubtful value to the estate.
104 There is an unexplained sentence in the court's opinion that the lessor, during
the trustee's administration, accepted less money from the debtor-lessee than was called
for under the lease. While the record sheds no light on this statement, such an
arrangement is often employed by helpful creditors to assist the debtor to regain
its fiscal balance. It is hard to believe that this fact could have influenced the court
in reaching its decision, unless it knew facts which it failed to mention.
105 Hotz v. Federal Reserve Bank, 108 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1939).
10 6 Andrews v. Beigle, 6 Ohio App. 427, 434 (1915). State equity proceedings
are not binding upon federal courts adjudicating proceedings under the Bankruptcy
Act, Petition of Portland Elec. Power Co., 162 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 837 (1947), but the case is illustrative of one court's handling of the problem.
107 It is not clear whether the lessor was merely a dummy corporation holding
rental properties for the debtor. The amended plan of August 4, 1964 stated:
The basis of this rejection is simply that Texas Importing Company, Ltd.,
acquired the said property as the alter ego of the debtor and an effort to deter-
mine this contention will be made and if said claims are proven to the satis-
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If that were the case, the inequities should have been discussed and
elucidated. Whatever the court's motivation, Texas Importing yields
an abstract rule of procedure which cuts against the hoped for
cooperation between creditors and the debtor. It unnecessarily
lengthens the administration of the estate with its requirement of
hearings and continual trustee reference to the court, and it reduces
the overall flexibility of trustee administration and increases costs.
The following alternative method of treating trustee adoption is
proposed. At the time the approved plan calling for the rejection of
a lease (or contract) already adopted by the trustee is presented for
confirmation, these two questions should be asked:
(1) Was the adoption, at the time it was effectuated by
the trustee, the result of a sound business decision, or did
the trustee fail to fulfill his fiduciary obligation? ...
(2) Did both parties consider the lease adopted, and
were its agreed-upon terms then considered binding by
them? 109
If the answers to both questions are positive, then the court is precluded
from allowing the lease's rejection. If the parties considered it adopted
and binding, but sound business judgment was not then exercised,
the trustee's adoption is effective only to the date of the contemplated
rejection in the plan; full rent must be paid as "an expense of adminis-
tration" from adjudication to plan confirmation. If the lease had
looked profitable when adopted, a change in business circumstances
faction of the Court then in that event the real estate involved will become an
asset of the Continued and Reorganized Company.
Record, pp. 86-87. (Emphasis added.)
In addition, two persons were appointed to draw up the reorganization plan-the
trustee and counsel for the debtor. Somehow the trustee allowed a plan to be drafted
which reversed his ratification of the lease made twenty months earlier (the final
plan was submitted May 8, 1964).
Further muddying the waters is the unexplained sentence in the court's opinion,
referred to in note 104 supra, noticing that the lessor accepted less than full rent
during administration. The negative implication which arises could be rebutted, if the
court so chose and the facts were consistent, as is suggested in that footnote.
108 Cf. In re Public Ledger Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1947) :
At any rate the trustees' action in assuming the contract obligation was taken
in good faith and according to their best judgment and must be held to have
been a necessary expense in administering the estate and is entitled to priority
as an administration expense.
(Emphasis added.) While this proposed question might seem an unnecessary ad hoc
determination which could be avoided by merely requiring the trustee to gain advance
approval of the court, it is suggested that such a requirement is inappropriate and
unnecessary. See note 56 .rupra.
It is also desirable to avoid determining whether the executory contract was one
which the trustee should have brought to the court. Such a question is beside the
point at the time of plan confirmation. The trustee's judgment should be respected
in so far as he has fulfilled his fiduciary obligation to exercise sound business judg-
ment; when he acts without exercising such judgment, or good faith, he is acting
ultra vires.
109 Cf. text accompanying notes 73, 77, 84, 88 supra.
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should not enable the court to permit the trustee to change his mind.11
This approach would have enabled the Texas Importing court to
search the record and find, if it were true, that trustee-counsel com-
munications had broken down and that the lease was always unprofit-
able, or that a questionable arrangement had been consummated. The
court could then have found no equitable consideration sufficient to
outweigh the need for the lease's rejection in the plan. Some measure
of certainty in creditor relations is necessary, but it needs to be bal-
anced with the need for speed and flexibility so important to a success-
ful reorganization.
110 Cf. Grief Bros. v. Mullinux, 264 Fed. 391 (8th Cir. 1920); It re Davega
Stores Corp., BANKR. L. REP. 60777 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), discussed at note 47 supra.
